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The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan
by Roya Akhavan-Majid
A lengthy field study in Japan using interviews and other sources and focusing
on the nation's five leading national newspapers and Tokyo's major television
stations finds evidence of much overlap between industry and the news media,
through interlocking directorships and social club memberships, for example.
Also journalists and other industrial leaders tend to be educated at the same
exclusive universities and journalists also belong to professional clubs in which
common values are shared. There already is a concentration of ownership of
Japanese mass media and, through the mean sketched in this study, one can find
how the mass media are integrated with other power centers of Japanese society.

Despite the growing importance of Japan on the international scene, the last five
decades have seen few analytical investigations of the postwar mass media in Japan. To
the extent that they do exist, studies of the Japanese mass media characterize the system
as essentially Libertarian, albeit one that tends to deviate, more so than its western
counterparts, from the Libertarian ideal-type. It is the contention of this paper, however,
that far from representing minor deviations, these anomalies reflect inherent structural
differences with the Libertarian model, calling for an altogether different
conceptualization.
The key characteristics of the alternative model exemplified by the Japanese mass
media system include 1) concentration of ownership (as opposed to diversity and
plurality of media units), 2) integration with other elite power groups (as opposed to
independence from the power elite), and 3) two-way flow of influence and control
between the government and the press (as opposed to freedom of the press from
government control). In the context of this model, the press — by virtue of the power
accrued from its concentration and integration into the elite power structure — is viewed
as an "elite power group" able to exercise reverse control on the ruling elite, even as it is
controlled by it. This reverse control, furthermore, is exercised not through theoretical
influence on public opinion, a diffuse influence which may or may not translate into
government policy, but through direct participation in government policy-making
structures and process. Motivated by its own interests, the media elite is then likely to
influence government policy in the direction of further concentration and conglomeration
(i.e., economic integration with big business), thus reinforcing the three major
components of the model in a positive feed-back loop.
Although certain aspects of the first two of the abovementioned characteristics
have been studied in the past with respect to a variety of mass media systems, few studies
have addressed the third characteristic, namely the media's ability to exercise reverse
influence on government policy directly and in the direction of its own interests.1 These
characteristics, furthermore, have never been viewed as components of a single press

structure and considered together as a coherent, theoretically interrelated set of
characteristics making up an alternative press model.
Against this backdrop the purpose of this study is to provide a framework for
understanding the Japanese mass media system, while also elucidating the components of
an alternative press model which could potentially provide a basis for the study and
reexamination of other press systems, including that in the United States. In so doing, this
study will focus on an analysis of the Japanese mass media system in terms of the
specific characteristics of the model delineated above.
Concentration of Ownership

The highly concentrated nature of the mass media in Japan is one of the major
characteristics contributing to the media's collective power over the other traditionally
recognized Japanese elite power groups.2
Media ownership in Japan is concentrated primarily in the hands of five major
mass media conglomerates which own newspaper and broadcasting enterprises all over
Japan. The five major national newspapers, Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Sankei,
with nationwide circulations of up to 13 million copies per day, are tied in cross-media
ownership to Tokyo's five key television stations NTV, TV Asahi, TBS, TV Tokyo and
Fuji TV respectively.3
The extensive cross-media ownership exists despite regulations which state that
the level of investment by a newspaper enterprise in a television station can not exceed
10% of the station's share.4 Using a variety of means, including investments through
"sister companies," however, the actual level of investment by each newspaper enterprise
in its affiliated TV station exceeds 50%.5 Despite regulations barring the key stations to
form network relationships with the local stations, furthermore, the key stations do in fact
function as networks, providing the local stations with more than 80% of their
programming.6
Again, despite regulations limiting the level of interlocking directorship between
the affiliated newspapers and televisions stations, each of the five newspaper-television
conglomerates is, in effect, controlled by the same person who often simultaneously
holds the chairmanship of the key station and the presidency of the newspaper
enterprise.7
In addition to the five national newspapers and broadcasting networks, media
ownership in these five media conglomerates also extends to magazines, sports tabloids,
and local newspaper and television stations.8
The overwhelming prominence of these media conglomerates on the national
scene implies strong potential power in exerting control on the flow of information. The
executives and managing editors of these conglomerates hold the power to cover up or
reveal any political scandal or to campaign for or against any interest. In this respect, the
senior members of these media conglomerates constitute a major power group in
Japanese society.

Integration with other Elite Power Croups

Mass media elite integration in Japan is based on the three primary components of
shared academic elite membership, personnel flow and overlap, and economic
interlocking.
In addition to being privileged members of sprawling conglomerates dominating
the channels of communication in Japan, Japanese media professionals are also members
of an academic elite. Without exception, all Japanese journalists entering any of the five
major national dailies are recruited through a three-stage process of written and oral
competition with rates of success as low as one per 150 participants.9 Almost all recruits
are new college graduates and come from such top prestige universities as Tokyo, Kyoto,
Waseda and Keio. In this way, they are members of the same "university clubs" to which
most powerful elite groups belong.
Within the context of Japan's highly competitive educational system, having been
able to enter and graduate from these top three universities confers an elite status on the
individual unlike any other in Japanese society. It is a distinction which not only opens
the door to top positions in Japanese elite institutions, but remains a strong component of
the individual's personal identity, group identification, and public image throughout his
life.
The academic elite status held by the majority of mass media practitioners in
Japan, thus constitutes the first component of mass media integration into the elite power
structure.
Another component of mass media-elite integration in Japan is the interlocking
between the media conglomerates and the Japanese bureaucracy, arising from the regular
flow of high-level bureaucrats from such related ministries as the ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT), into top executive positions in the media industry. This flow
is part of a larger pattern of personnel flow and overlap between various elite power
groups in Japan, the most conspicuous of which is the institutionalized practice of
"amakudari" or "descent from heaven" on the basis of which, every year, Japan's retiring
top-level bureaucrats take up executive positions in industries previously under their
jurisdiction.10
A third component of mass media-elite integration exists at the economic level
between the five media conglomerates and Japanese big business, based upon the
extensive investments made by big business in the broadcasting industry. Japan's five
media conglomerates are, in effect, joint ventures between big business and the mass
media industry. The financial interlocking between the two power groups, furthermore,
has increased substantially since the advent of new media technologies as Japanese big
business has joined the media conglomerates in dominating ownership patterns in such
new media as teletext,11 cable television, and direct broadcast satellites (DBS).
In the case of teletext, the mass media-big business interlocking has come to
include NHK, the country's public service broadcaster. Since 1985, NHK has been a

major shareholder in two commercial teletext companies (Japan Teletext and Kinki
Teletext) established under NHK-big business ownership.12 Japan's third commercial
teletext broadcasting company (Telemo Japan), is a joint venture between big business
and the five media conglomerates.13
Cable TV ownership patterns in Japan reflect a similar interlocking between the
country's major businesses and mass media conglomerates. Although cable television as a
means of program origination has yet to take off in Japan, in terms of ownership it is
dominated by a giant mass media-big business joint venture. Formed in June 1986, the
joint stock company was itself the result of a mega merger between six cable TV
companies established a few years earlier under big business-mass media ownership.14
Japan's first commercial DBS is also planned as a mass media-big business joint
venture. Of the three DBS channels to be carried by Japan's first operational direct
broadcast satellite (BS3) after it's launch in 1991, one is planned as a commercial channel
to be operated by Japan Satellite Co., a joint venture between Japan's most prominent
businesses and the five mass media conglomerates.15
The mass media in Japan, therefore, are characterized not only by a high level of
concentration in ownership, but also by a growing integration and interlocking with the
Japanese big business.
Indeed, it may be argued that, in the absence of enforced anti-trust and
concentration of ownership regulations, conglomeration as a means of market domination
represents a logical and natural business response to the threat of competition.
Accordingly faced with the threat of competition from the new information technologies,
the existing vested mass media interests in Japan have coalesced with major Japanese
businesses in their efforts to dominate the new media markets; a move which allows them
to not only raise the necessary capital, but also to share the risks of entering what is likely
to be a potentially lucrative but as yet uncertain market. As we will see, the media's
ability to evade existing ownership regulations, and to successfully lobby for their
gradual elimination through the exercise of direct influence on Japanese media policy,
has been a concomitant part of this process, lending positive reinforcement in turn to the
circular process of concentration of ownership, economic interlocking with big business,
and growing influence on government policy.
Two Way Flow of Control between the Government and the Press
One of the major characteristics of the Japanese press as an elite power group is its
ability to exert reverse influence on the government in the direction of its own interests.
Before going on to discuss this process of reverse control, however, let us explore the
nature of the government control of the press in Japan.
Government Control of the Press. The first element of government influence on
the press in Japan is its subtle control on the newsgathering process. The journalist's
access to news and information in Japan is constrained through a variety of factors. In
order to be able to gather information, Japanese journalists need to be members of bona

fide news organizations. Such a membership, in turn, entitles the journalist to join the
appropriate reporter clubs "kisha kurabu" which function as the primary conduits of
official information.
Every major public, governmental, or private organization has its own reporter
club and provides lounges, desks, and work space for reporters specifically assigned to
cover its activities.16 These Kisha clubs, therefore, function as almost exclusive channels
of information regarding the pertinent institutions and it is within the confines of the club
walls that much of the reporter/official interaction takes place. In addition to restricting
free individual access to news sources, the collective and exclusive nature of Kisha club
news-gathering in Japan is responsible for a striking uniformity in news coverage among
various media organizations.
The Japanese reporters' ability to gather information is further constrained by the
fact that officials in Japan are not legally bound to disclose information. Several laws in
Japan restrict the disclosure of various types of information by government employees,
while there exists no law to safeguard the reporters' access to official information.17
Within the context of Japan's legal literature, the "freedom of newsgathering" is cited as a
principle deserving of respect. Unlike the freedom of expression, however, it is not
guaranteed.18
The subtle restrictions and controls placed on the process of newsgathering in
Japan thus translate into the need for media professionals to attract the cooperation and
friendship of the bureaucratic/political elite so as to be able to perform their journalistic
function. This, in turn, has encouraged the routine practice by news organizations of
assigning each of their political reporters to a specific politician or high level bureaucrat.
Often, this is a lifetime commitment, tying the fortunes of the journalist to those of the
official assigned to him. The personal ties thus formed between the reporters and their
sources can sometimes be so strong as to create "factional" struggles within news
organizations, mirroring those within the party and the bureaucracy.19
These structural and organizational characteristics enable the officials in Japan to
exercise direct as well as indirect control over the news media. Unlike the censorship
exercised in the so-called "authoritarian" countries, however, press control in Japan is
based not on coercion, but on subtle restrictions on news-gathering which lead to
functional dependence on the part of media professional on the friendship and favor of
government officials.
Press Control of the Government. The government's control of the mass media in Japan,
however, is not complete. And, inasmuch as the Japanese bureaucratic and political elite
have come to rely on the press for favorable explanation of their actions and policies, to
that extent has the press in Japan been able to develop its own power and gain
considerable control over the government elite. The Japanese press exercises this power
by selectively concealing or revealing damaging political facts. The highly concentrated
nature of mass media in Japan, enabling each media conglomerate to reach millions of

people on a national scale, represents a major element of the Japanese media's power in
this respect. With widely read national newspapers as well as well-placed friends in the
national government readily at its disposal, each media conglomerate in Japan has the
potential power to influence extensively, if not make or break, the career of any given
member of the bureaucratic/political elite.
The subsequent need on the part of the government elite to ensure good relations
with the press in Japan has, among other things, led to routine efforts on the part of the
government officials to solicit and accommodate the interests of the mass media
conglomerates in all matters of media policy. Throughout the 198O's, during which much
of Japan's new media policy has been formulated, the media conglomerates have been
represented on all relevant "policy advisory committees"—which constitute the primary
structures of policy-making in Japan20— and have wielded visible influence on the policy
outcomes.
In the case of teletext, for example, the media conglomerates have been able,
through their direct participation in the policy-making structures, to score major victories
with respect to deregulation of ownership, allowing them to preempt competition and
dominate ownership patterns in the new medium.
Since early in teletext's development, Japan's media conglomerates had shown
great concern in relation to the possible threat that the new medium might pose to their
newspaper publishing and broadcasting interests and asserted their right to dominate
teletext broadcasting in Japan. In so doing the media conglomerates lobbied for
1) total elimination of the existing cross-media ownership regulations, allowing the
media conglomerates to obtain majority shares in the new medium, and
2) categorization of teletext as electronically transmitted "text"; and subsequent
removal of all content regulations including the "fairness and balance"
requirements normally applied to broadcasting on the basis of the Broadcast law.21
While, in view of its interest in regulating the new medium, MPT, Japan's primary
telecommunications and broadcasting authority, remained unfavorable to the media
conglomerates’ insistence on teletext's classification as a "print" medium, in November
1985, it agreed to relax the cross-media ownership limits, allowing each media
conglomerate to hold up to a 30% share in teletext businesses.22 This raised the previous
level of permissible investment by 20%. Responding further to the media conglomerate's
demands, MIT exempted teletext broadcasters from the educational and public service
programming requirements contained in the Broadcast Law.
Faced with continuing pressure from the Japan Publishers and Editors Association
(NSK) and the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters, MPT revised its
"teletext broadcasting licensing policy" once again in October 1987, removing all
restrictions on ownership and control of teletext broadcasting by the media
conglomerates. The decision, reached by MPT under organized mass media pressure, was
hailed by NSK as "a milestone in pushing forward deregulation.23

Cable television policy in Japan provides another example of direct mass media
influence on government policy. Although as a means of signal enhancement and
retransmission, cable has existed in Japan since 1955, it has yet to take off as a means of
program origination.24 Although factors such as the relative abundance of television
channels and the lack of sufficient program production capacity have been partially
responsible for this slow growth, the long-standing opposition by the media
conglomerates to any program origination CATV ventures has played a major part in
determining the nature and pace of cable TV development in Japan.
The first program origination venture in Japan, launched in 1968 by a company called
NCV, was strongly opposed by a coalition of Japan's mass media conglomerates and the
country's public broadcaster, NHK.25 Seeking to respond to the strong protest on the part
of the mass media elite, yet lacking any legal grounds to block the venture, MPT asked
NCV to allow the existing broadcasters to join it as partners in the proposed cable TV
company, leading to a forced coalition among adversarial interests which brought an
effective halt to the venture.26
Adopted in 1972, not long after the NCV episode, Japan's Cable Broadcast Law also
strongly favors the media conglomerates, enabling the existing broadcasters to exercise
direct veto power over the fate of any newcomers into the business. The law, for
example, requires new cable operators to get retransmission consent from the existing
broadcasters.27 Because better reception of the over the air channels remains an important
incentive for cable subscription in Japan, the inability to provide such a service could
seriously affect prospect for any new cablecasting enterprise.
The interests of the existing broadcasters are further served by the fact that from the
beginning no limits were imposed on cable ownership by either the Cable Broadcast Law
or the MPT regulations.28 As a result, the current cable television ownership patterns in
Japan are dominated by a handful of mass media-big business consortia which
collectively control the pace and extent of cable development in Japan.
Even in the case of DBS development which, aside from its implications for the
broadcasting industry, is directly tied with the larger objectives of Japan's space program,
the interests of the media conglomerates have been in the forefront as a major policy
criterion. Although the general opposition by Japans mass media to commercial DBS
development has thus far failed to change MPT's plans to devote one of the three
channels on Japan's first operational DBS (BS3) to commercial broadcasting, the media
conglomerates have succeeded in preserving their interest on several grounds. First, in
addition to their 35% share (which includes the 19% share held by the commercial
broadcasters and the 16% share held by the five major newspapers), the media
conglomerates hold the marketing and programming rights in the commercial DBS
company, giving them effective control over the channel and the pace of its
development.29 Second, based upon the conglomerates' lobbying against the use of
advertising in DBS, a subscription system is currently being considered as the primary
means of financing for the proposed commercial channel.30

Although a basic conflict of interest between NHK and the media conglomerates,31
arising from NHK's disproportionately larger share of the channels on the proposed BS3
satellite, remains a major obstacle in the path of DBS development in Japan, extensive
efforts by MPT continue in the context of various advisory committees to resolve the
conflict— a fact which attests further to the powerful role played by the mass media in
shaping Japan's new media policy. Given the level of influence exercised by the media
conglomerates on all matters of media policy in Japan, the ultimate resolution of the
ongoing conflict between the two groups remains a major prerequisite to the successful
implementation of Japan’s DBS program.
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
Based upon such characteristics as concentration of ownership, integration with
other elite power groups, and subsequent ability to exercise direct influence on
government policy, the mass media in Japan represent a major elite power group in,
Japanese society. Far from representing a unique case, however, the alternative model
exemplified by the Japanese mass media may be considered to provide a framework for
the study and reexamination of other press systems currently subsumed under the
Libertarian theory. Such reexamination would be particularly relevant in the case of the
United States, in which a growing concentration and conglomeration in media ownership,
and a major media deregulatory trend fueled by extensive lobbying on the part of vested
media interests has long been in evidence. A comprehensive reexamination of the
existing Libertarian systems may lead to the conclusion that the Libertarian model of the
press is being gradually replaced by an Elite Power Group model.
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